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Abstract 
In recent years, corporate social responsibility is an increasingly prevalent concept in 
the field of business and academia as well. More and more profit-making corporations 
actively promote their caring and socially responsible image. In the non-profit field, 
such as governments, international organizations, and social groups, are playing vital 
roles in the rapid diffusion of CSR. The interaction among various groups has made 
CSR a prominent phenomenon in today's society. In this research, CSR performance 
is indicated and viewed through the lens of corporate philanthropy. 
Different from the wide recognition of corporate philanthropy today, the early 
appearance of this concept was controversial. Corporations used to regard maximizing 
shareholders' profits as their most and the only important responsibility, and practices 
beyond this were likely to be considered violating the nature of business. In this 
regard, this research is conducted in attempt to understand the conditions and 
motivations that drive corporate philanthropic behaviors. Whether the company has 
contributed and the amounts of philanthropic contributions are identified as two 
dependent variables to indicate corporate philanthropy in this research. 
In addition, most existing researches focus on the corporate philanthropy and 
phenomena in developed regions in Europe and the United States, leaving the 
knowledge and understanding of corporate philanthropy in developing regions 
insufficient. This research, grounded on a survey about "privately-owned enterprises 
in China", aims to fill the gap by looking into corporate philanthropy in China. 
This research reveals that the prevalence of corporate philanthropy in China is no less 
than its counterparts in developed areas. The majority of surveyed enterprises have 
made contributions to charity programs in China. To understand the underlying 
factors, this research reveals that both rational incentives, including the economic 
incentive and the political incentives, and the institutional factors, including 
normative influences and cognitive influences, demonstrate significant effect on 
whether a corporation makes any charitable contribution. However, it is also found 
that only normative influences and cognitive influence remain significant in analyzing 
the amount of contribution. 
This result suggests that entrepreneurs who are driven by normative and cognitive 
influences are not only interested in making contribution but making significantly 
higher amount of contribution as well. Those who are driven by rational incentives are 
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interested in making gesture-like contributions. 
To sum up, multiple factors, including economic rationality, normative influence, 
cognitive influence, and the unique political incentive in China, help explain together 
the corporate philanthropy in China. The corporate philanthropic behaviors in China 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In recent decades, "Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR hereafter)" has come into 
public spotlight and sparked wide discussions among both the field of academia and 
business. More and more corporations include CSR into their business agenda, build a 
corporate image in favor of CSR in different kinds of public activities, and respond to 
external accusation of being irresponsible. All these make CSR an evident and heated 
topic more than ever. 
Studies focusing on CSR practices in developing regions are relatively fewer than 
their counterparts in developed regions. Intuitively, the general public might think that 
the CSR practices in developed areas should be much more abundant and 
sophisticated. However, the research on global CSR practices undertaken by Grant 
Thomton found that "the percentage of privately held business incorporating CSR 
policies into a formal responsible business practice program" is much higher than the 
global average (74o/o versus 56%) (Grant Thomton IBR 2008). This result is quite 
surprising. Thus, this research is carried out to explain corporate philanthropic 
behaviors among Chinese privately held enterprises. 
This research focuses on corporate philanthropy as a type of CSR practice among 
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private firms In China. This research aims to understand what factors play a 
significant role In driving corporate philanthropy In China and how these 
philanthropic behaviors by Chinese private firms differ from their western 
counterparts. 
I draw on three theoretical frameworks to understand corporate philanthropic 
behaviors from economic rationality perspective, new institutionalism perspective, 
and the perspective of political incentive. The philanthropic behaviors of each 
enterprise are examined through whether the owner or major investors made any 
charitable contributions as well as how much they made, and two statistical analysis 
models were used to tackle these two different ways of seeing philanthropic 
behaviors. 
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Chapter 2: Research Significance 
2.1 Theoretical significance 
This research attempts to identify factors that have significant impact on corporations' 
philanthropic behaviors. In other words, it aims at identifying set of conditions under 
which corporate philanthropic behaviors are more likely to occur. To date, most 
literature in the study of CSR is from the business or technical point of view, such as, 
whether there is correlation between CSR and financial performance; or what and 
how responsible behaviors should be carried out so as to maintain or Improve 
corporate image etc. Most CSR literature in the field of business shares the underlying 
normative assumption. Contemporary researchers tend to acquiesce in the 
righteousness of CSR, and few questions this underlying assumption as their 
predecessors did. Besides, fewer studies analyze CSR from a non-normative and 
non-utilitarian perspective. Therefore, this paper attempts to provide a non-business, a 
sociological perspective to study CSR, and thus contribute to the CSR literature by 
taking away the normative assumption and investigating the influence of broader 
societal conditions on corporations' responsible behaviors. 
In addition, this research further contributes to the field of CSR studies by focusing on 
the corporate philanthropy of privately owned enterprises. Looking into the existing 
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literature, the majority of them examines attributes of corporate responsible behaviors 
through cases and practices of public companies or multinational companies. Relative 
shortage of studies on CSR of private firms is in part due to the lack of data on private 
firms. By examining corporate philanthropic practices of private firms, this study will 
complement existing research on public and multinational corporations and further 
our understanding about CSR in China. 
2.2 Empirical significance 
Empirically, this research aims at identifying significant driving forces of corporate 
philanthropy in China. Nowadays, there are large amounts of efforts, from 
governments and non-governmental organizations, encouraging as well as pressuring 
corporations to carry out responsible behaviors. By applying factors driving CSR in 
western societies and Chinese society, this research can help identify the key drivers 
for corporate philanthropy in China. Government and social active groups can thus 
better understand the underlying mechanisms effective strategies in promoting 
corporate philanthropy in China. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
3.1 Background of CSR 
In the field of business, the contemporary fervor of CSR in the world can date back to 
the 1960s when the major resurgence of CSR interest initially took place in the United 
States (Vogel, 2005a) The heyday of social movements during that period cultivated 
considerable hostility toward business, which was especially severe among college 
students to the extent that it affected corporations' recruitment. A survey conducted in 
1967 of college students reported that 61% found "their fellow students to be 
indifferent or hostile toward working in industry."(Fich, 1969) Therefore, the change 
in social sentiment put pressure on a large number of corporations to pay attention to 
their social responsibilities. 
In addition to the social context of the time, the change in the structure of the business 
system has been identified as another factor contributing to the modem development 
of CSR (Vogel, 2005b; Lippmann, 1961 ). The managerial revolution occurred around 
the turn of last century exerted significant influence over modem business system in 
the aspect of separating the ownership and control. The separation of ownership and 
controlled to two results related to business leaders behaving more responsibly. First, 
the separation made neither the compensation nor the tenure of managers directly 
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linked to its earnings or share price, and thus reduced the incentive of managers to 
maximize profits. Second, the separation meant that managers could have different 
agenda and priorities from owners. "Unlike owners, managers were in a position to 
balance the claims of the firm's stockholders, consumers and the public tn 
general ... managers could use corporate resources to pursue a variety of 
goals-essentially making companies into multipurpose social institutions." 
(Whitman, 1999) 
To sum up, the initial appearance of CSR in the West or in the United States was 
driven by both social pressures on profit-making companies as well as managers' 
personal incentives released from the managerial revolution. 
3.2 The conceptual development of CSR 
Theoretical attempts at CSR can be traced back to as early as the 1950s. At the time, 
CSR was perceived to be an obligation of companies, and there were not so much 
discussions about the reasons or driving forces of CSR. For example, in the landmark 
book Social Responsibilities of the Businessman, Bowen argues that "social 
responsibility is the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make 
those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the 
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objectives and values of our society" (Bowen, 1953) 
Since Howard Bowen's pioneering work, the body of CSR literature has been 
proliferating till today. Among the wide discussion about CSR in the past decades, 
two major controversies emerged in the conceptual development of CSR. These two 
controversies, summarized below, provide a starting point to understand why or why 
not companies carry out philanthropic activities. 
The first divergence lies in the normative question of whether corporations should 
assume social responsibility. For those who are against business assumption of social 
responsibilities argue that social responsibility is by no means inherent to business 
entity, and that business entity has no obligation to carry out social responsibility. 
After all, according to this camp, business is about making and maximizing profits. 
Milton Friedman, who is second to none in his famous objection to CSR, said that few 
trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free 
society-allowing businesses to make as much money as possible for their 
shareholders-as the acceptance of a social responsibility (Friedman, 1962). 
For those who advocate the assumption of social responsibility of business entity, 
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being socially responsible is part of the obligation embedded in business entities. 
Therefore, it is a must for the business entity, which is also part of the society, to carry 
out socially responsible conducts. For example, Paul Samuelson argued that "a large 
corporation these days not only may engage in social responsibility, it had better try to 
do so" (Samuelson, 1971 ). 
The second major divergence involves the relationship between CSR and bottom-line 
performance. Numerous amounts of research have been carried out to investigate the 
relationship between CSR behaviors and financial performance. For those who 
advocate a positive correlation between these two, they argue that investing in CSR 
today can help a corporation improve its long-term profitability by enhancing 
business reputation and preempting potentially more costly government regulations 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997). In contrast, those who are against CSR usually ground 
their arguments on the negative correlation between CSR and a corporation's 
bottom-line performance. They argue that investment in CSR is likely to lower 
economic efficiency and profits, and pass the hidden costs onto stakeholders (Wright 
& F erris, 1997). Despite the large number of research, the relationship between CSR 
and financial performance is still inconclusive (Vogel, 2005b ). 
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3.3 Definition of CSR 
The concept of CSR is notoriously difficult to define. Since its appearance, no 
universally agreed definition of CSR has been constructed and, instead, there are quite 
a few contested understandings about what core elements CSR should contain. 
However, the idea that CSR behaviors should at minimum exceed legal requirement 
has been the consensus among CSR researchers. Among varying definitions that 
appeared in CSR literature, the definition proposed by Me Williams and Siegel (200 1) 
has so far the most widely cited and accepted one among academic discussion about 
CSR. According to them, CSR can be broadly defined as "actions that appear to 
further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required 
by law." 
3.4 Why or why not corporations make philanthropic contributions? 
3.4.1 Economic rationality for doing corporate philanthropy 
Traditionally, the responsibility of corporations is nothing but making and maximizing 
profits within the limits permitted by law and regulation. As an increasing number of 
companies make philanthropic contributions that are seemingly contradictory to profit 
maximization principle, researchers started to study underlying factors that drive 
philanthropic activities. 
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Friedman is most well-known for his strong opposition against CSR. He publicly 
opposed the idea of CSR as he viewed that the very fundamental about business is 
nothing but to maximize profits for shareholders. He sums up his view in his 
widely-cited statement, "social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." 
(Friedman, 1970) 
Interestingly, there are advocates of corporate philanthropy today who also share the 
same assumption of profit maximization as Friedman's. Different from Friedman who 
argues doing CSR would impair the economic performance, today's advocates tend to 
see the positive relation between corporate philanthropy and the financial 
performance. This argument views the main driving force for corporate philanthropy 
as its economic reward. 
Why is there such a shift in the views on corporate philanthropy from bottomline 
damages to bottomline benefits? The concept of public visibility extracted from the 
existing literatures is introduced below to help the explanation. 
3.4.2 Public Visibility 
Different from Friedman's vtew on corporations that are mainly accountable to 
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shareholders, corporations today are under wider exposure to public and increasing 
scrutiny by government, NGOs, consumers and investors (Chan and Welford, 2005). 
Along with the wider exposure, it has been increasingly recognized that corporate 
image is the most important intangible asset of a company, and researches reveal that 
taking up social responsibility proved to be significant components of the corporate 
image (Lee, 2004). There have been many incidents in which companies accused by 
NGOs of unsustainable business practices found their products or services boycotted 
and their brand name tarnished (Welford, 2002). For these two reasons, corporations 
perceived irresponsible are likely to be accused of mismanagement and recklessness. 
In this sense, corporate social responsibility is vital to the financial performance and 
long term profitability of some companies (Chan and Welford, 2005). 
Thus, from the perspective of corporate image, we can see that advocates still apply 
the assumption that the primary, if not sole, purpose of the firm is to maximize wealth 
for shareholders. However, different from their early representative Friedman who 
presumed that emphasis on corporations' social responsibility would impair 
shareholders' profitability, contemporaries advocates tend to emphasize the positive 
connection between social responsibility and corporate profitability, or, from the other 
side of the same coin, the potential risk and impact on bottom-line performance that 
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irresponsible behaviors may lead to. As Lovins and Hawken (1999) stated, "the 
companies that first make (responsible practices) will have a competitive edge." They 
added, "Those that don't make that effort won't be a problem because ultimately they 
won't be around." 
However, not every company faces the same risk of damage when neglecting 
corporate social responsibility. As Vogel observed "The importance of reputation 
varies across companies and sectors .... companies with highly visible brands are much 
more vulnerable." In other words, companies with highly visible brands are likely to 
be easy targets of active groups under the "naming and shaming" strategy, which 
makes these companies more responsive to external attacks on their brand name and 
image. Shell and BP are typical examples of facing risks to their corporate reputation 
due to their social and environmental practices. 
In addition to visible brands, companies listed on the stock market are under more 
severe scrutiny and have larger exposure to the public. Previous research suggests that 
listed companies ought to be more sensitive to issues related to CSR, or, in other 
words, they are more vulnerable to the accusation of irresponsible behaviors from the 
public (Chan and Welford, 2005). Thus, whether the private enterprise is a publicly 
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listed one is also included to measure its public visibility. 
Hypothesis 1: Corporations will be more likely to have corporate philanthropic 
behaviors when companies are more publicly visible. 
3.4.3 Institutional perspective 
Even though there has been the claim that doing corporate philanthropy can improve 
corporate image and thus benefit the financial performance, there is no conclusive 
evidence. Researchers started to ask, why corporations keep carrying out corporate 
philanthropy even though no conclusion has shown that doing corporate philanthropy 
will do any good to their bottom line performance. To give better explanation of this 
problem, new institutionalism theory is introduced below. 
New institutionalism argues that actions taken by actors are not merely out of the 
efficiency concern. Responding to and complying with the general environment in 
which actors operate are more important concerns. In the case of CSR, from the 
viewpoint of new institutionalists, the fact that more and more corporations follow 
CSR is because of broader institutional pressures rather than highly calculative 
actions. By complying with the rules and norms of the institutional environment, 
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acting responsibly can help corporations gatn legitimacy, which may refer to the 
degree of cultural support for an organization (Meyer and Scott 1983:201 ). Therefore, 
from new institutional point of view, corporate philanthropy came to be viewed as an 
appropriate activity of business. 
To new institutionalism, large amounts of researches taken to build a link between 
these two are efforts to justify the appropriateness of doing corporate philanthropy. 
Porter and Kramer (2003) pointed out that CSR has been more than one kind of 
business strategy and become "an inescapable priority". Margolis and Walsh 
insightfully observe that "empirical evidence of a positive causal relationship moving 
from social performance to financial performance also promises, for some, a solution 
to endless debate about the social role and responsibilities of the firm ... " (Margolis 
and Walsh, 2001) Vogel makes it even clearer by stating that "the rationale for many 
of these (studying relationship between social responsibility and financial 
performance) is clear: to legitimate a broader conception of the firm's role and 
responsibilities by integrating it with a narrower financial conception." (Vogel, 2005b) 
Therefore, the belief that corporations can do well by doing good makes CSR 
legitimate, in the sense that CSR is well in line with business's fundamental demand 
for making profits. 
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Curious about "given the incentives for maximizing profit and shareholder value, why 
would a corporation ever act in socially responsible ways?", Campbell specified a set 
of institutional conditions that affect the likelihood of socially responsible corporate 
behavior, including public and private regulation, the presence of nongovemmental 
and other independent organizations that monitor corporate behavior, institutionalized 
norms defining appropriate corporate behavior, associative behavior among 
corporations themselves, and organized dialogues among corporations and their 
stakeholders. 
Thus, by viewing CSR from the broader institutional environment where corporations 
operate, Campbell proposed how the likelihood that firms will act in socially 
responsible ways is institutionally conditioned. Certainly, Campbell has undeniable 
contribution to the studies of CSR. However, he did not clearly specify those 
institutional conditions and more importantly the hypotheses that he proposed have 
not been tested empirically. 
According to new institutionalism perspectives, institutions refer to clusters of 
relatively stable rules that govern social activities in a society and provide shared 
understanding of the cultural meaning of those activities (Scott, 2001; Meyer & 
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Rowan, 1977). 
In organization studies, new institutionalism argues that organizational attributes are 
not products of artificial design, but are largely and deeply influenced by the 
environment they are embedded in (Selznick, 1953 & 1957). To this regard, the 
common perception that organization is designed to achieve efficiency by rational and 
calculative means is no more than an illusion, or according to them, a "rational myth" 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). On the contrary, they argue that corporate actors virtually 
behave in a surprisingly irrational way based on the observation that more and more 
corporations become similar to each other without being more and more efficient. In 
order to survive, "organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for 
political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic 
fitness."(Carroll & Delacroix, 1982) It is the need for both financial soundness and 
social acceptance and credibility (Scott et al. 2000: 237) that drives the seemingly 
irrational behavior among corporations. Scott (1995) identified three types of 
mechanism that drive corporations to carry out similar practices and become 
isomorphic, namely, regulative pillar, normative pillar, and cultural-cognitive pillar. 
Regulative pillar can be understood through examples as rules, laws and sanctions 
which have a coercive power for organizations and individuals to abide by; indicators 
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of normative pillars are certifications and accreditations which include values and 
norms for governing behaviors; the cultural cognitive pillar, which is the focus of 
attention and distinctive feature of new institutionalism, refers to common beliefs and 
shared logics of action that are either imposed on or adopted by individual actors and 
organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The regulative pillar of the new institutionalism theory usually focuses on policy and 
regulation of different regions or countries. 1 For the normative influence, previous 
CSR literature suggests that being associated with professional organization helps to 
spread and diffuse norms. As Campbell's hypothesis predicts, "Corporations will be 
more likely to act in socially responsible ways if they belong to trade or employers 
associations that support socially responsible behavior." In a similar way, when 
association and communication extend beyond managers or owners themselves and 
involves other stakeholders, corporations seem to be more likely to act in socially 
responsible ways due to the increase in interaction and mutual understanding between 
managers/owners and their stakeholders (Campbell, 2004; Fligstein, 2001). 
Hypothesis 2: Corporations will be more likely to have corporate philanthropic 
1 However, because this survey was targeting privately held business in Mainland China, it did not 
make any cross-regional comparison, and thus it lacks the heterogeneity in CSR policy or regulation. 
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behaviors when owners or maJor investors are associated with professional 
organizations outside the companies. 
In addition, perceived social status is also incorporated as an indicator of normative 
influence. Subjective social status is common in stratification research (Haug, 1977; 
Hodge and Treiman, 1968). It is also found in previous research that individuals with 
higher status attainment tend to contribute more to the group and have a stronger 
motivation to do so, as people with higher social status are more inclined to earn their 
status by doing something good to the group. For owners or investors with higher 
perceived status, it 1s believed that they are more likely to assume social 
responsibilities so as to live up to the norms attached to their status. In order to obtain 
and maintain higher status, they have to conform to social norms and social 
expectations, including the expectation that they make hefty contribution to the public 
good (Wilier, 2009). 
Hypothesis 3: Corporations will be more likely to have corporate philanthropic 
behaviors when owners or major investors have higher perceived status. 
The cultural cognitive influence 1s pivotal 1n new institutionalism, for it 1s the 
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emphasis on cognitive assumptions that distinguishes new institutionalists from 
institutionalists prior to them. It is also the most difficult and intangible influence to 
be explicitly measured. The example provided by Fligstein ( 1991) is widely regarded 
as one of the most ingenious design for proper measurement of cognitive elements. 
Among the 100 firms that he researched, he found that firm leader's subunit 
background-the subunit the leader used to be before he or she came to take 
leadership-significantly influenced whether a firm would end up with diversification 
strategies. The influence of subunit background cannot be satisfactorily accounted for 
by other factors but by cognitive variations. Being inspired by this research design, I 
select the previous experience and background of business person as the indicator of 
the cognitive factor that influences entrepreneurs' decisions for philanthropic 
activities. 
Hypothesis 4: Corporations will be more likely to have corporate philanthropic 
behaviors when owners or major investors have previous experience related to 
corporate philanthropy. 
3.5 Research on CSR in China 
Practices of CSR in China are nascent. It is necessary to review the relevant literature 
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so as to understand the similarities and differences between CSR in the west and in 
China. To understand the corporate philanthropy in China, it is important to situate the 
analysis in the social and cultural characteristics of China. Tang and Li (2009) 
reviewed China's corporate philanthropy in their recent paper from several 
perspectives: the corporate-state relation, corporate-society relation, and 
corporate-NGO relation. Not surprisingly, the state has significant influence over the 
development of corporate social responsibility in China. But NGOs, on the contrary, 
have few opportunities to exert influence over corporate philanthropy or the related 
policy. And except for a few prominent projects, collaborations between NGOs and 
corporations are usually irregular and short-term. Different from companies operating 
in the western countries, companies operating in China do not usually experience 
influence or pressure from NGOs or active groups, which are considered as one of the 
biggest differences in doing corporate philanthropy between companies in China and 
overseas (Tang and Li, 2009). 
To further explain the reason why the state government has such significant influence 
over the development of corporate philanthropy, He and Tian (2008) incorporate 
resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) to examine the public 
relations strategies of compantes operating tn China. Since 1978, the Chinese 
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government has played a very important role in economic development and continues 
to exert great influence on the operations of firms in China (Nee, Opper, & Wong, 
2007). The government has controlled not only valuable tangible resources, such as 
capital and land, but also intangible resources, such as approval mechanisms and 
preferential policies, on which firms in China depend for their survival and 
development (He and Tian, 2008). Thus, for business operating in China, government 
bureaus at all levels are considered as powerful special interest group and key 
stakeholders (He and Tian, 2008). Large amount of literatures reveal that in China it is 
the government, rather than the general public, which is the most important 
stakeholder for firms (Sull, 2005; Taylor & Kent, 1999; Tian, Hafsi, & Wei, 2007). 
Thus, for their dependencies on the government, companies develop 
"government-oriented PR strategies" as their political strategy in China. 
He and Tian further reveals different patterns of government-oriented PR strategies 
adopted by different corporations based on their type of ownership. It reveals that 
private enterprises in China tend to use various PR strategies to get close to the 
government, and participation and philanthropy are two important components of 
their strategies. Philanthropy mainly refers to charity giving to various causes, no 
matter whether it is to educational programs, financial supports for disaster areas, or 
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other causes. And participation means the corporation's participation In 
government-related activities, such as participation in the People's Congress (He and 
Tian, 2008). Thus, in the analysis of corporate philanthropy in China, the underlying 
political incentive is an indispensable element to understand the corporate 
philanthropic behaviors among Chinese private enterprises. 
Similarly, Ma and Parish (2006), in their "Tocquevillian Moments: Charitable 
Contributions by Chinese Private Entrepreneurs", reveal the similar underlying 
political incentive of the charitable contributions made by Chinese private enterprises. 
They described the relationship between business philanthropy and political action in 
general, and identify the specific context of Chinese society and historical moments 
that need taking into consideration when studying CSR in China. They argued that, in 
mature democratic countries, where legal system and regulations are well established, 
private businesses normally gain access to politicians through campaign donations, 
and gain legitimacy and marketing visibility by giving to non-governmental 
organizations. However, in more closed societies ruled by strong states, where 
top-down political control prohibits non-governmental organizations and campaign 
contributions are rare, official contribution channel provided by government becomes 
the only available channel for business to access to political power and exert their 
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influence. On the other hand, government in these societies needs to deal with 
increasing demand for social welfare which can be alleviated by non-profit 
organizations in open societies. Therefore, this particular societal condition-business 
has little or no access to power and prestige and government is short of revenue to 
provide social welfare- help to form a special exchange relation between business 
and government. In the case of China, Ma and Parish revealed that Chinese 
entrepreneurs gave considerable charitable contributions because these contributions 
elicited social and political benefits in return. This proposition was backed up by the 
empirical findings that charitable contributions had a significant effect on becoming a 
political representative and increase in social status. 
Ma and Parish contributed to the literature of CSR tn China by identifying the 
underlying political incentive of business charitable giving. The exchange relation 
between business and government through the channel of charitable giving is a unique 
phenomenon in societies like China, where newly emerged business class eager for 
political access and government dominates social welfare system. 
To sum up the abovementioned literature about corporate philanthropy in China, there 
are basically three features that we need to bear in mind in the following analysis. 
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First, the state government has significant influence over the development of 
corporate philanthropy in China, and the influence from the general public and NGOs 
are much fewer than those in the west. Second, due to the resource dependence on the 
government, companies operating in China tend to develop government-oriented PR 
strategies to manage their relationships with the government. Thirdly, private 
enterprises carry out government-oriented PR by participating in People's Congress as 
well as by charity giving and they are believed to get a seat in People's Congress by 
charity giving, as charity giving from business is what the government needs and 
willing to accept. 
Thus, when considering the above viewpoints of corporate philanthropy in China, the 
5th hypothesis of this research is generated as below: 
Hypothesis 5: Corporations will be more likely to have corporate philanthropic 
activities when the owner or major investors participate in Peoples Congress. 
3.6. Theoretical Framework 
To sum up, the five hypotheses of this research are generated from three different 
perspectives, namely, arguments from economic rationality, new institutionalism, and 
the political incentive. For arguments of economic rationality, I introduced the 
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concept of public visibility to generate the first hypothesis that corporations are more 
likely to carry out corporate philanthropy when they have higher public visibility. For 
arguments of new institutionalism, there are three hypotheses generated from different 
indicators of new institutionalism arguments. The first hypothesis from new 
institutionalism perspective is that, corporations will be more likely to have corporate 
philanthropic behaviors when owners or maJor investors are associated with 
professional organizations outside the companies. Here whether owners or maJor 
investors are associated with professional organizations IS an indicator of the 
normative influence of doing corporate philanthropy. The second indicator perceived 
social status, and it is hypothesized that corporations will be more likely to have 
corporate philanthropic behaviors when owners or maJor investors have higher 
perceived status. The third hypothesis from new institutionalism arguments is that, 
corporations will be more likely to have corporate philanthropic behaviors when 
owners or major investors have previous experience related to corporate philanthropy. 
This is to indicate the cognitive influence in doing corporate philanthropy. 
Economic Rationality Normative Factor Cognitive Factor Political Incentive 
,, ,, 
... .... 
... Corporate Philanthropic Behaviors .... 
Graph 1 : Theoretical framework 
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Chapter 4: Data and Method 
4.1 Data 
This research is based on the Survey of Privately-owned Enterprises in China that was 
conducted in 2005 by the Chinese Private Economy Research Committee2 . Since 
1992, the Chinese Private Economy Research Committee has conducted bi-annual 
nationwide surveys on privately owned enterprises, covering those that differ in their 
s1zes, locations, and industries so as to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
development of private economy in China. I use the 2005 survey for this study. 
As of the end of 2005, China had 4.3 million privately owned enterprises. One in 
every thousand enterprises had a chance of being selected for the survey, and the data 
set containing 4,300 private enterprises. Respondents were either owners or major 
investors of private firms and a few other non-public firms. In China, private firms are 
required to register with the Industry and Commerce Bureau (Gongshang Ju). Thus, 
the survey started with private firms that had registered with Industry and Commerce 
Bureau by the end of 2005, and used the nationwide information of registered firms to 
assign a proportional quota of responding firms to each province. The number of 
firms selected within each province is proportional to the size of that province. Within 
2 This research is jointly established by the United Front Work Department, All-China Federation of 
Industry and Commerce, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and China Society of 
Private Economy Research. 
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each provtnce, stratified sampling was used to ensure cities and counties with 
different sizes and economic development levels were probabilistically selected. In 
each selected city or county, firms were divided into clusters according to their urban 
and rural and industry categories. Researchers probabilistically selected firms from 
different clusters until the quota was met, and there was at least one firm from each 
cluster as representative respondent. By doing so, a sample data with variation is 
ensured. This dataset includes sampled firms from 31 provinces in China, including 
both rural and urban areas, and 19 different industries were selected to ensure the 
variety. The survey contains 41 main questions, with several follow-up questions for 
some of the main ones, eliciting information on the owner of the private firm as well 
as the firm itself. The response rate of the 2005 survey was 85.9o/o. Originally, there 
are 4300 cases in this data set. After deleting the cases with missing values for 
relevant variables, 1965 observations are used in the analysis. 
There are some concerns about the representativeness of the surveyed firms. Ma and 
Parish (2006), for instance, noticed a problem of the firms included in the 1995 survey 
of privately-owned enterprises in China, which I think is still relevant to the 2005 
dataset that is used in this study. Because of the inclination to boosting local 
companies, and their link with local government, the local association responsible for 
-34-
selecting respondents tended to select big and well-performed enterprises as their 
local representative. Therefore, although on average registered private firms have only 
13 employees in 2006 (Chinese Statistics Yearbook), the sampled private firms have 
277 employees on average. The median number of employees in the sampled firms is 
40, which implies that a few extremely large cases might have been selected and 
pulled up the average number of employees for all sampled firms. As previous 
research found that the number of employees and the amount of firms' charitable 
donations are positively correlated, the sampled firms may have made 
more-than-average amounts of charitable donations. However, because the focus of 
this research is the causal relationship patterns, and in the regression models we use, 
size is an independent (control) variable in the model, selection on size does not bias 
our estimates of the coefficients in our model. Thus, biased selection is not likely to 
affect the result. 
4.2 Methods 
Two regression models are used in this research. The first one is logistic regression. 
Logistic regression is adopted to specifically address whether the company made any 
contribution at all in 2005. Thus, those with no contributions are coded 0, and those 
with at least some contributions 1 regardless of their amount. After the logistic 
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regression, To bit regression is applied to address the question of how much charitable 
contributions were made, instead of whether they made any. In other words, 
observations that made no contribution at all are excluded from this model. And only 
corporations that did make charitable contributions are included in the Tobit model. 
This treatment is to separate those who at least made some contribution, regardless of 
how small the amount might be, from those who did not make any. 
These two statistical models are estimated to examine whether and to what extent the 
amount of charitable contribution given by private firms is influenced by three sets of 
factors, namely, factors derived from new institutionalism theory, economic 
rationality theory, and political incentives. 
Several variables contain outliers which drastically pulls up the average value of that 
variable. To understand whether and to what extent these outliers would have an 
impact on the result, the regression models were estimated with and without the 
outliers after the variables containing outliers were identified. However, there was no 
noticeable change in the statistical significance as well s the coefficients of those 
variables containing outliers. I thus present the findings without removing outliers .. 
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4.3 Measurement 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables: 
The firms' philanthropic behavior is measured by two dependent variables, one is 
whether owners or major investors made any charitable contributions, and the other 
one is how much contributions they made. In the survey, respondents were asked 
about the amount of philanthropic donation they gave in 2005. Among 1965 
respondents who answered how much money they donated for charity causes in 2005, 
the reported amount varies a lot. It ranges from zero to 3 million yuan, with a mean of 
62,800 yuan and a median of 10,000 yuan. The large disparity between the mean and 
the median indicates that some firms made extremely large amounts of donations. 
To tackle the skewed distribution, I took natural logarithm of donation amounts. In 
addition, in order to avoid creating additional missing values and maintain zero 
equivalent to "make no donation in 2005" after logging raw data, zero value in raw 
data was recoded to 1 so that it resulted in zero after being logged. This data 
transformation resulted in the variable of logged donation amount in 2005 ranged 
from zero to 14.5, with zero indicating make no donation in 2005. In addition, a new 
variable indicating whether the corporation made any charitable contribution in 2005 
was generated, with 0 indicating no charitable contribution at all while 1 indicating 
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the corporation did make donation in 2005. This new variable is used in the logistic 
model as the dependent variable. 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Looking into independent variables, the above theoretical frame help identify four sets 
of variables that reflect different theoretical views on CSR. Independent variables 
reflecting the economic rationality theory are "number of brands owned by the private 
enterprise". Independent variables reflecting the new institutionalism theory include 
amount of educational background, government background, social status of the 
respondents, and if the respondent participates in any business/industry associations. 
Lastly, independent variable reflecting political incentive is whether the respondent is 
a representative of National People's Congress. I will introduce these three groups of 
independent variable in the following. 
First of all, two variables are selected to indicate the public visibility. One is the 
number of brands owned by the private enterprise. Respondents were asked how 
many brands were developed and owned by their firms in the scope of country, 
province and city/county respectively. A new variable was generated by adding up the 
number of nationwide, province-wide, and county-wide brands owned by each firm. 
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The number of brands owned by enterprises varies a lot, ranging from zero to sixty 
with the mean around .5. The other variable indicating economic rationality is 
whether the enterprise is listed in the stock market. As noted earlier, the more publicly 
visible a company is, the more likely this company is to have philanthropic activities. 
Secondly, three variables are selected to capture possible normative pressures to do 
corporate philanthropy. One is whether the respondent participates in any industry 
associations. If owners or major investors of a corporation are associated with any 
industry or business association, this variable is coded 1, and otherwise 0. The other 
variable is the perceived social status of owners or major investors of the corporation. 
In this survey, respondents were asked to rank respectively their economic, social, and 
political status against a social ladder, based on the perception of their own status in 
comparison to other members of society. Respondents were given a social ladder 
containing ten stair steps, with one indicating the top and ten indicating the bottom 
status. Therefore, this perceived status is treated as an ordinal variable and, by 
inverting the same scale, value of ten indicating the highest perceived status while the 
value of one indicating the lowest. In addition, due to a high correlation among the 
perceived economic status, social status, and political status, a new variable named 
"social status" was generated by merging the original three to eliminate the 
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collinearity. The variable "social status" aggregates scores of the three variables and 
ranges from 3 to 30. On average, entrepreneurs reported the aggregate social status of 
17.4 out of 30, with the lowest perceived status equal to 6 and the highest one equal to 
30. 
Information on respondents' previous job is used to capture the cultural-cognitive 
influence. Respondents were asked what their major experiences were before starting 
up their own private firm. There were 11 answer categories, including political cadre 
and government officials, state-owned enterprises, village head, peasant, 
self-employed, other private firms, unemployed, military, emigrant worker, no 
working experience, and others. As previous research revealed the impact of linkage 
with government and party on corporate philanthropy among Chinese entrepreneurs, I 
grouped the 11 categories into those with government-related background (political 
cadre, government official, state-owned enterprise) and those without (the rest of the 
answer categories). The former is coded 1 and the latter 0. In addition to the variable 
of government-related job background, respondents' educational level is also used to 
capture the cultural cognitive influence. Respondents' educational level varies from 
primary school to postgraduate degree, with junior high, senior high, junior college, 
and bachelor degree in between. More than half of the respondents (54.6o/o) had 
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degree of higher education (junior college or above) This variable is coded from 1 to 
6, with 1 indicating the lowest level of educational background and 6 indicating the 
highest. 
To identify the impact of political background on charitable giving, I used whether 
respondents held members of National People's Congress (NPC), the highest state 
body of China, as the indicator of the political background. 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
Last but not least, to make firms of different scale into comparable, variables of 
organizational size in 2005 is included as a control variable. The organizational size is 
measured in two ways. One is the amount of revenue generated in 2005, and the other 
is the number of employees in 2005. It is reasonable to assume that, on average, 
companies with more revenue are likely to make more charitable donations. There is 
large variation in revenues, ranging from zero to more than 3 billion yuan, with the 
mean of about 67 million yuan. The natural logarithm of the revenue is used in the 
analysis. Similarly, the number of employees is also included as a control variable, 
and it was logged as well in this research. 
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Graph 2: Relationship between dependent variables and independent variables 
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Whether and 
amount of corporate 
philanthropic 
contribution 
Chapter 5: Findings and Discussions 
Three sets of theories pertaining to corporate philanthropy are examined in this study. 
The findings from logistic regression and tobit regression are presented in the tables 
below. 
Table 1: Logistic Regression of whether the company made philanthropic contribution 
in 2005 
Coefficient Odd Ratio 
Public visibility 
No. ofbrands .1468 1.162 
Listed -3.935 .019 
Normative Influence: 
Association with professional org. .4246 1.543 
Perceived social status .1276 1.137 
Cognitive Influence: 
Gov. related background -.6406 .521 
Edu. Background .1931 1.210 
Political incentive 
Representative ofNPC 1.009 2.747 
Control variables: 
Amount of revenue 2005 .2423 1.275 
No. of employees 2005 .2152 1.245 
Notes: (a) observations = 1965 (b) LR chi2(10) = 776.17, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(c)Log likelihood= -819.37806 (d) Pseudo R2 = 0.3214 
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Notes: (a) observations= 1965 (b) 598 left-censored observations at 
ln _don,...., 1 0000<=0, 1367 uncensored observations 
5.1Significance of variables indicating arguments of economic rewards 
The number of brands owned by the private firm, and the stock-market listing of the 
firm are used to examine economic incentive arguments. The number of brands has a 
positively odd ratio t of 1.16 (P<.05), which means that a one-unit increase in number 
of brands will make it 1.16 times likely for the company to make charitable donations. 
The variable of listed status is negatively correlated with whether the enterprise has 
ever contributed. The odd ratio between these two is .19, meaning that listed 
companies are .19 times likely than non-listed companies to make a contribution. 
According to To bit regression model, the number of brands owned by enterprises has 
no significant relationship with the amount of charitable contribution, and the listed 
status continue to have a strong negative correlation with the contribution amount. 
The positive correlation between number of brands and whether the enterprise has 
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ever contributed 1n the logistic model proves that enterprises with higher public 
visibility are more likely to contribute than those who are not publicly visible. 
However, the insignificant relationship in the Tobit model also shows that, once the 
publicly visible enterprise made contributions, an increase in public visibility does not 
necessarily drive it to contribute more. In other words, the enterprise tends to 
contribute as long as it owns brands; however, it is not the case that the more brands it 
owns, the more contributions it makes. It is not difficult to think why it is such a case. 
Once a corporation owns a famous brand and become highly visible to public, adding 
another brand does not tend to make it more well-known or visible. For example, 
Nike is one of the companies that is highly visible and becomes easy target for 
accusation of sweat workshop from the public. However, Nike just has one brand, and 
corporations that have more brands than Nike are not necessarily more visible than 
Nike is in front of the public. 
The negative correlation between listed status and the amount of charitable 
contribution is consistent across two models. To explain the negative effect of listed 
status, we need to bear in mind that, different from brands which are mainly consumer 
oriented, the biggest stakeholder for a listed company is its shareholders. Thus, to be 
accountable to its shareholders, listed enterprise has to address the primary concern of 
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its shareholders, which is to maximize profits rather than being socially responsible. 
When looking back into the development of CSR, Vogel revealed that in early 1980s 
the stock price of a corporation would decrease when the corporation released news 
related to charitable contributions, for the reason that shareholders doubted that the 
management team made wise investments. Considering these two factors-lack of 
social groups in China and the strong commitment to shareholders of listed 
enterprises-it becomes easier to understand why listed firms are less likely to make 
charitable contributions than non-listed firms in mainland China. 
5.2 Significance of variables indicating new institutionalism 
5.2.1 Variables indicating the normative influence 
The hypotheses drawn from new institutionalism theory are examined first of all with 
the membership in business or industry associations. This variable is statistically 
significant to the amount of charitable contribution given by the entrepreneur of 
private firm (odds ratio 1.54, and coefficient 1.45, p < 0.001 ), implying that 
entrepreneurs associated with the aforementioned organizations are 1.54 times more 
likely than those who are not to make at least some contributions. They also tend to 
contribute 4.39 times of contribution than those who are not. This finding is consistent 
with the research conducted in Western societies, which suggests that entrepreneurs 
affiliated with trade or employer associations tend to be more socially responsible, 
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especially when these associations support socially responsible behaviors. The 
Chinese business associations have promoted charities. The Federation of Industry 
and Commerce that most entrepreneurs in my sample are associated with (23 85 out of 
3572), for example, have had programs promoting charities among businesses 3 . 
Therefore, these organizations have been nurturing the norm of business charity 
giving and diffuse it to businesses affiliated with them. 
Owners or major investors with higher perceived social status are more likely to make 
charitable contributions and to contribute more amounts when they do. Those who are 
one unit higher in social status tend to make 1.30 times of contributions. 
Entrepreneurs with higher perceived social status, including economic, social and 
political dimensions, tend to have more recognition of social responsibility and 
charities. 
5.2.2 Variables indicating the cultural-cognitive influence 
Two variables, education background and government-related background, are used to 
capture the cultural-cognitive influence. The variable of education background has a 
significant effect on the amount of charitable contribution as well as on whether the 
3 Campaigns and programs promoting philanthropic behaviors can be found in their websites from time 
to time. 
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corporations made any contribution. (odd ratio 1.210, coefficient .557, p < 0.001) The 
difference in educational background of entrepreneurs is. Therefore, one unit change 
in educational background means change in the level of degree/diploma received, and 
one unit increase in owners' /investors' education level will make it 1.21 times likely 
to make charitable contributions. The higher education the owner or investor has 
received, the more amount of charitable donation he or she is likely to give. 
In contrast, entrepreneurs' government-related background is negatively correlated 
with whether they made any contribution and the amount of charitable contributions 
as well (odd ratio .521, coefficient -1.186, P <.00 1 ). Entrepreneurs who used to work 
in government bodies, party organizations, or state enterprises are less likely to make 
any contributions at all and when they do, they are likely to make smaller donations. 
Different experiences prior to current status are treated as an indicator of difference on 
cultural-cognitive dimension, as previous experiences help shape one's belief and 
value system. In this regard, what does the negative effect of government background 
on the amount of contribution imply? 
Existing literature provides two perspectives to interpret such a result. First, 
entrepreneurs with government-related experience should have been influenced by the 
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norms favorable to charitable giving behaviors, as most philanthropic campaigns in 
society are initiated and led by the government. However, it is noteworthy that it is 
these entrepreneurs who chose to leave government bureaucracy and stated-owned 
enterprises. In other words, different from managers' departmental background in 
Flistegin 's ( 1991) research that showed an extent of continuity, entrepreneurs with 
government background in this research chose to leave the government bureaucracy 
and enter the private sector. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that those who choose to 
leave government or state-owned enterprises were likely to have a different set of 
cultural-cognitive beliefs from the one promoted by government, or, even dislike 
government's norms and propaganda, for otherwise they might have stayed and 
continued to work as government officials or state-owned enterprise managers. In a 
word, the rupture with previous government-related experience helps to explain why 
the governmental background is negatively correlated with charity giving among 
entrepreneurs. 
Secondly, this negative correlation can be also explained through the lens of the 
political incentive. If corporate philanthropic behavior is a means to gain political 
access, as suggested by Ma and Parish (2006), those who had government-related 
experience have already secured such access and thus have less incentive to make 
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philanthropic contributions. In other words, their previous government background 
already provided them with political capital and access to officials, leaving it 
unnecessary for them to get such accesses through charity giving. 
For this regression result only, both interpretations are possible, and it is hard to tell 
which interpretation is more appropriate for this result. Thus, further research is called 
upon to tell them apart and provide a more accurate interpretation. 
5.3 Significance of variable indicating political incentive 
Entrepreneurs' status as a representative of National People Congress (NPC) is used 
to examine the impact of political incentives on charitable giving. The result reveals 
that entrepreneurs who are NPC representatives are more likely than those who are 
not to make charitable contributions. The odd ratio was 2.75, which means that the 
former are 2.75 times more likely to do so than the latter. However, according to the 
Tobit model, the occupation of the political office had no statistically significant effect 
on how much they contributed (P >.05). This interesting result seems to indicate that 
for entrepreneurs who serve as representatives of the People's Congress, it is the 
gesture of donation instead of the actual amount of donation that matters once they 
manage to have access to the political power. To better understand and interpret this 
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result, the selection process of the NPC representative needs to be examined. 
5.4 Summary 
I have examined how each of normative and cognitive pressures drawn from new 
institutionalism theory, economic incentives, and the political incentives has affected 
corporate philanthropy among private firms in China. Take a closer look at the 
findings, there are two variables-number of brand and whether the owner/investor is 
NPC representative- that show significant effect in the logistic model, but not in the 
Tobit model. And also two variables, listed status and government-related background, 
demonstrate different results from the hypotheses. The rest of the variables are 
consistent with the hypotheses. 
The membership in business and trade associations is positively correlated with the 
amount of charitable contributions they made, meaning that entrepreneurs involved in 
professional associations are likely to make more contributions. Similarly, corporate 
owners or major investors who have higher perceived status are more likely to make 
charitable contributions and contribute more as well. These results show that 
normative factors have significant influence in driving corporate philanthropy not 
only in whether any contribution is made but the amount of contribution as well. 
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Educational levels are positively correlated with the amount of charitable contribution, 
while the government-related background 1s negatively correlated with the 
contribution amount. This reveals that entrepreneurs with higher educational 
background tend to make more charitable contributions than the lower ones, while 
entrepreneurs who previously worked for government-related institutes are likely to 
make fewer contributions than those who did not. 
The number of brand has a significant positive effect on whether owners/investors 
make charitable donations, but it does not have a significant impact on how much 
amount they contribute. Interestingly, the listed status variable has significant negative 
effect on both the contribution behavior and the amount of contribution. This shows 
that the number of brands makes corporations more likely to contribute, but they are 
not likely to contribute more with the increase in number of brands. In other words, 
corporations with more brands are more likely to contribute due to their public 
visibility, but another increase in the number brands does not have significant in 
driving larger amount of contribution. In contrast, listed companies are less likely to 
make charitable contribution and make fewer amounts. One of the possible reasons is 
that, the biggest stakeholder listed companies need to be accountable to is 
shareholders who have very different concerns from ordinary consumers, are likely to 
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doubt about the ability of the company to make wise investment when certain 
amounts of revenue was put into charity giving. 
For variable indicating the political incentive, the NPC representatives are more likely 
to make donations but among those who do, the status of the NPC representative had 
little effect on the amount of donations. This result shows that those driven by 
political incentive are only interested in making gesture-like contributions, and once 
they contributed, they are not likely to make larger amounts than those who are not 
representative. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This paper attempts to examine major factors that influence privately-held enterprises' 
philanthropy in Mainland China. The majority of existing literature on CSR and 
corporate philanthropy more specifically has focused on Western countries and few 
has paid attention to developing regions. Thus, this research began by reviewing 
major CSR discussions and arguments in Western societies, mainly the United States 
and then examined the CSR practice in China. To understand the increasing popularity 
of CSR, this research has investigated three sets of explanations for corporate 
philanthropy, that is, normative and cognitive pressures drawn from new 
institutionalism theory, economic rationality, and political incentive arguments. The 
new institutionalism theory and economic rationality are usually regarded as 
competing theories, with one arguing the logic of appropriateness while the other one 
advocating the logic of instrumentality of human behaviors. In this research, on one 
hand, factors generated from both the two theories demonstrate significant impact on 
corporate philanthropic behaviors; on the other hand, the research also reveals that 
corporate owners with strong political incentive are more likely to make charitable 
contributions, even though they are not necessarily to contribute more. 
This research also reveals that variables indicating new institutionalism theory show 
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more consistent impact on the philanthropic behaviors in this research. The regression 
results of variables indicating new institutionalism arguments are stable across two 
models, and most of these variables, except for the one indicating previous experience, 
are consistent with hypothesis and existing literature. In contrast, variables indicating 
economic rationality and political incentive have different results in significance in 
two models, and two variables show different results from the prediction of 
hypothesis and literature. 
To put it generally, it ts found that variables of economtc rationality, new 
institutionalism, and political incentive all have significant effect on whether 
corporations made any contribution, regardless of the amount they made. However, 
when analyzing how much contribution they made, only variables indicating new 
institutionalism remain the same significant result, and variables indicating economic 
rationality and political incentive are no longer significant once the analysis only 
focuses on how much the contribution was. If we group the economic rationality and 
political incentive together and regard them as rational incentives that drive corporate 
philanthropy, the result reveals that rational incentives have significant impact only in 
whether the corporation made any contribution, but not significant in the amount of 
contribution they made. In contrast, different from rational incentives, normative 
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influence and cognitive influence have significant impact not only in whether the 
corporation made any contribution, but also how much they made. In other words, it 
can be interpreted that, owners or major investors who are driven by rational 
incentives are only interested in making gesture-like contribution, while only owners 
or major investors driven by normative or cognitive influence care about the amount 
of contribution as well as making the contribution. Similarly, for the case of China, 
this research reveals that political incentive does play an important role in driving 
corporate philanthropic behaviors, but only to the extent of gesture-like contribution. 
This research has the following limitation. For corporate social responsibility, this 
research adopts corporate philanthropic giving as the variable to indicate corporate 
social responsibility. Though charity giving is an important part of a company's CSR 
performance, CSR contains more diversified components. Thus, indicating CSR only 
by the variable of corporate philanthropy has limitation in providing a comprehensive 
picture of CSR performance. Thus, future researches are called upon to further 
explore other dimensions of CSR. 
-59-
Reference: 
Aguilera. R.V., & Jackson. G. 2003. "The cross-national diversity of corporate 
governance: Dimensions and determinants" Academy of Management Review: 28, 
447-465. 
Bakker, Frank G. A., Peter Groenewegen, & Frank Den Hond, 2005 .. "A Bibliometric 
Analysis of 30 Years of Research and Theory on Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Corporate Social Performance. Business & Society", Vol44 No. 3. 
Bamard, C.I. 1938. The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Bowen, H. R. 1953. Social responsibilities of the businessman. New York: 
Harper&Row. 
Business Week, 1967. "Why Business Faces Campus Ire?" August, 9. 
Campbell. J. L, 2004. Institutional change and globalization. Princeton. NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Camp bell. J. L, 2006. "Institutional Analysis and the Paradox of Corporate Social 
Responsibility". The American Behavioral Scientist; Mar 2006; 49, 7 . 
. camp bell. J. L, 2007. "Why should corporations behave in socially responsible ways? 
An institutional theory of corporate social responsibility" Academy of Management 
Review. Vol. 32. 
Carroll, A.B. 1979. "A Three-dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Social 
Performance." Academy of Management Review, 4, 497-505. 
Carroll, A. B. 1999. "Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional 
Construct". Business & Society, Vol. 38, September. 
Carroll, A. B. (Ed.). 1977. Managing corporate social responsibility. Boston: Little, 
Brown. 
Carroll, Glen, & Jacques Delacroix, 1982. "Organizational mortality in the newspaper 
- 60-
industry of Argentina and Ireland: An ecological approach." Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 2 7. 
Committee for Economic Development. 1971. Social responsibilities of business 
corporations. New York: Author. 
Chan, Jason Chi-hin and Richard Welford, 2005, "Assessing corporate environmental 
Risk in China: An Evaluation of reporting activities of Hong Kong listed enterprises", 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 88-104. 
Clark, L.M. 1939. Social Control of Business. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Davis, K. 1960. Can business afford to ignore social responsibilities? California 
Management Review, 2, 70-76. 
DiMaggio, Paul J., & Walter W. Powell, 1983. "The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields." American 
Sociological Review. vol. 48. 
Doh, J. P., & Guay, T.R. 2006. "Corporate social responsibility, public policy, and 
NGO activism in Europe and the United States: An institutional-stakeholder 
perspective." Journal of Management Studies. 43: 47-73. 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Global Business Barometer, 2007. Online survey 
of 1192 global executives. 
Dowell, Glen, Stuart Hart, & Bemard Yeung. 1999. "Do Corporate Global 
Environmental Standard Create or Destroy Market Value?" Management Science 46. 
No. 8. 
Eells, R.,&Walton, C. 1974. Conceptual foundations of business (3rd ed.). Burr Ridge, 
IL: Irwin. 
Fich, Gordon, 1969. "Students in Business: What Do They Think About It? Why?" 
Vital Issue, March. 
Fligstein, N. 1991. 'The structural transformation of American industry: an 
institutional account of the causes of diversification in the largest firms, 1919-1979'in 
The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Waiter W. Powell and Paul J. 
- 61 -
DiMaggio ( eds.),311-336. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Fligstein. N. 2001. "Social skills and the theory of fields" Sociological Theory. 19. 
105-125. 
Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston: 
Pitman. 
Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Friedman, M. 1970 "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits" 
Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance. ed. Walther Ch. Zimmerli, Klaus 
Richter, Markus Holzinger. Berlin ; New York : Springer. 
Gerde, V.W., & Wokutchm R.E. 1998. "25 years and going strong: A Content 
analysis of the first 25 years of the Social Issues in Management Division 
Proceedings." Business & Society, 37(4), 414-446. 
Grant Thornton, International Business Report. 2008. 
Heald, M. 1970. The social responsibilities of business: Company and community, 
1900-1960. Cleveland, OH: Case Western Reserve University Press. 
Haug, Marie R. 1977. "Measurement in Social Stratification." Annual Review of 
Sociology 3:51-77 . 
. He, Yuanqiong and Zhilong Tian, 2008, "Government-Oriented Corporate Public 
Relation Strategies in Transitional China", Management and Organization Review 4:3 
367-391. 
Johnson, H. L. 1971. Business in contemporary society: Framework and issues. 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Jones, Thomas M. & Andrew C. Wicks. "Convergent Stakeholder Theory". The 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 24, No. 2. 
Kreps, T. J. 1940. "Measurement of the social performance ofbusiness" An 
investigation of concentration of economic power for the temporary national 
economic committee. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
- 62-
Lee, Betty Kaman, 2004, "Corporate image examined in a Chinese-based context: A 
study of young educated public in Hong Kong", Journal of Public Relations Research, 
16(1), 1-34. 
Lippmann, Waiter, 1961. Drift and Mastery. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Lovins, Amory, Hunter Lovins, & Paul Hawken, 1999. "A Road Map for Natural 
Capitalism" Harvard Business Review: 158. 
Lunheim, Rolf. 2004. "Building the Myth of Corporate Social Responsibility", the 
Third Annual Colloquium of the European Academy of Business in Society (EABIS). 
Brussels. 
Manne, H. G., &Wallich, H. C. 1972. The modern corporation and social 
responsibility. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research. 
Matten, D., Crane, A., & Chapple, W. 2003. "Behind the Mask: Revealing Social 
Initiatives by Business." Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(2), 66-89. 
Ma, Dali & William L. Parish, 2006. "Tocquevillian Moments: Charitable 
Contributions by Chinese Private Entrepreneurs" Social Forces: 85,2. 
March, J. (1994): A primer on decision making: How decisions happen. New York: 
.Free Press. 
Margolis, Joshua Daniel and James Patrick Walsh, 2001. People and Profits? The 
Search for a Link between a Company 's Social and Financial Performance. Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates. 
McGuire, J. W. 1963. Business and society. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
McWilliams, Abagail, & Donald Siege!. 2001. "Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Theory of the Firm Perspective". Academy of Management Review. vol26, No. I. 
117-127. 
Meyer, J.W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony". American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-363. 
-63-
Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R., & Wood, D.J. 1997. "Toward a theory ofstakeholder 
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts." 
Academy of Management Review, 22: 853-886. 
Mohan, A. 2003. Strategies for the Management of Complex Practices in Complex 
Organizations: A Study of the Transnational Management of Corporate 
Responsibilities. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Warwick, United 
Kingdom. 
Porter, M.E., & Kramer, M. R. 2003. The competitive advantage of corporate 
philanthropy. Harvard Business Review on corporate social responsibility: 27-64. 
Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Roe, M.J. 2003. Political determinants of corporate governance. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rowley, T.J., & Berman, S. 2000. "A Brand New Brand of Corporate Social 
Performance." Business & Society, 39(4), 397-418. 
Samuelson, P. A. 1971. Love that corporation. Mountain Bell Magazine. 
Selznick. P. 1953, TVA and Gross Roots. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Selznick. P. 1957. Leadership in Administration. New York: Harper & Row 
Scott, W. R. 2001. Institutions and Organizations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Skapinter, Michale, & Alison Maitland, 2002. "Does Caring Boost the Bottom Line?", 
Financial Times, March 3. 
Steiner, G. A. 1971. Business and society. New York: Random House. 
Tang, Lu and Li Hong Mei, 2009, "Corporate social responsibility communication of 
Chinese and global corporations in China", Public Relations Review. 
http:/ /www.sciencedirect.com/science? _ ob=ArticleURL& _ udi=B6W5W-4WM68BH-
1 & _user= 1 0& _ rdoc= 1 & _ fmt=& _ orig=search& _ sort=d& _ docanchor=&view=c& _ace 




Vogel, David, 2005a "The Revival of Corporate Social Responsibility", The market 
for virtue : the potential and limits of corporate social responsibility. Washington, 
D.C. : Brookings Institution Press. 
Vogel, David, 2005b "Is There A Business Case for Virtue?" The market for virtue : 
the potential and limits of corporate social responsibility. Washington, D.C. : 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Waddock, S., & Graves, S. 1997. The Corporate Social Performance-financial 
performance link. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 303-319. 
Walsh, J. P., Weber, K., & Margolis, J.D. 2003. Social Issues and management: Our 
lost cause found. Journal of Management, 29: 859-881. 
Walton, C. C. 1967. Corporate social responsibilities. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Welford, Richard. 2005. "Corporate Social Responsibility in Europe, North America, 
and Asia 2004 Survey Results." Journal of Corporate Citizenship, Issue 17. 
Will er, Robb, 2009. "Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to 
the Collective Action Problem" American Sociological Review, Vol 74. 
, Williamson. 0 . E. , 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free 
Press. 
Whetten, D.A., Rands, G., & Godfrey, P. 2002. "What are the responsibilities of 
business to society?" Handbook of Strategy and Management, ed. A. Pettigrew, H. 
Thomas, & R. Whittington. London: Sage. 
Whitman, Marina. 1999. New World, New Rules: The Changing Role of the American 
Corporation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Wright, P., & Ferris, S. 1997. "Agency Conflict and Corporate Strategy: The effect of 
divestment on corporate value." Strategic Management Journal, 18: 77-83 . 
-65-
CUHK Libraries 
004660041 
